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So geographers in Afric maps, 
With savage pictures fill their gaps 
And o‘er uninhabitable downs 
Place elephants for want of towns 
 
Jonathan Swift1 
 
The field of development has produced a vast and multifarious body of knowledge on 
and about ‘Third World cities’.  The topic unites texts from disciplines as diverse as 
economics, political science, public administration, sociology and anthropology as well 
as planning and architecture.  And it covers an extensive index of subject matter, 
anything from the cultural determinants of architectural form to the practicalities of 
urban waste management.  Not surprisingly, academics outside the field often react 
with suspicion when confronted by the “irreducible untidiness” of development studies 
(Hulme & Turner, 1990: 8).  How can such an apparently disparate set of research 
interests constitute a coherent body of knowledge?   
 
In the literature on cities and development, one finds very little to justify the general 
field of discourse.  If the geography of the ‘developing world’ is defined at all it is 
usually defined unproblematically in terms of national economic statistics.  
Sometimes, the controversy surrounding words like 'Third World' or 'developing 
country' is acknowledged.  Generally, however, definitional difficulties like this are 
quickly dismissed and research is justified by reference to the supposedly self-evident 
reality of the cities and countries specified within the investigation. Gilbert and Gugler 
maintain they merely use the category “Third World” as a “convenient shorthand” to 
denote the nations they list in Africa, Asia and Latin America (1992: 6-7).  Similarly, 
Hardoy and Satterthwaite may criticise development’s many “inaccurate 
generalizations and conceptions”, but they do so not in order to reject its terminology 
but merely to validate their own claims to discover “what is actually happening in Third 
World cities” (1989: 9).  Like all those who write in this area they presuppose that the 
discourse of development is capable of accurately representing real places. 
 
Drawing upon evidence from the Kenyan context, this chapter argues that urban 
research in the field of development has never and cannot accurately describe the 
world.  Development is not a tangible process or even a quantifiable goal 
(notwithstanding the wealth of positivist literature that assumes otherwise).  It exists 
only as a domain of knowledge or ‘discourse’, a particular combination of signifying 
practices, vocabularies, narratives, images or ideas (Barnes and Duncan, 1992: 8).  
And, like all discourses, it bears the cultural imprint of its creators.  
 
However, development academics’ interpretations of non-Western cities have been 
shaped by understandings that are not only culturally specific, but are also necessarily 
political.  From the very first writings in the field to the present, their research has been 
distinguished by a preoccupation with imaginary differences and hierarchies.  The 
‘Third World city’,2 as described in development discourse, is not an empirical reality.  
It is a Western invention, an imaginative construction that has helped to sustain a 
geometry of power and control that the West has exerted over its non-Western 
‘Others’ in one form or another since the first days of colonialism.3  Consequently, this 
chapter concludes, development discourse is actually a barrier to meaningful 
communication between Western and non-Western people.   
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 B u i l d i n g  H e g e m o n i e s :  T h e  S o c i a l  
C o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e  ’ T h i r d  W o r l d  C i t y ’  
 
In November 1991 an international workshop on cities and development was held at 
University College London.  In addition to the usual gathering of academics who 
frequent such events, the workshop was attended by representatives from the World 
Bank the UNDP, GTZ and the former ODA.  This event marked something of a shift in 
the field of development generally, that is, the revival of the city as a development 
imperative after nearly a decade of neglect and disparagement by these agencies.  It 
was also one of the first times that official donors began to define a place for 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the arena of urban poverty alleviation, 
enlarging further a form of ‘charitable development’ that has been expanding rapidly 
under official patronage since the early 1980s.  In the published proceedings that 
followed the workshop, Nigel Harris noted the significance of this new urban agenda.  
He drew a vivid picture of the emerging landscape in “developing countries” and the 
enormity of the task ahead.  After presenting the reader with a whole series of 
alarming statistics and predictions about population growth in ‘Third World cities’ he 
tells us,  
 
The most striking feature of this [rapid process of urbanization] is the 
vast spread of squatter settlements and shanty towns, ill supplied, if at 
all with basic amenities.  Rapid environmental deterioration, giant traffic 
jams, violence and crime, urban sprawl eating into the countryside, these 
are some of the most striking visible features of the growth of large cities 
in developing countries (1992: x). 
 
Most development academics are probably familiar with the image of disorder and 
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crisis typified in Harris’ representation of the generalised ‘Third World city’.  Devas and 
Rakodi have remarked that descriptions like this are something of a cliché in the field 
of urban development (1993: 1). They form the standard entry-point to nearly every 
undergraduate and postgraduate dissertation on the city in development studies.  It 
almost seems as if the imagery itself is a mandatory learning requirement on the 
development curriculum.  Even though Devas and Rakodi recognise the hackneyed 
language, they still follow the convention themselves, adopting a similar style of 
writing with all the usual statistics to emphasise their point.  The researcher, they 
maintain, cannot escape the “basic facts” of mal-development in Third World cities.   
 
Escobar and Crush (1995), two critics of development writing from a post-structuralist 
position, maintain that images like these are prevalent in development generally and 
can be traced throughout the history of the discourse.  They offer a very different 
explanation for their prevalence.  Representations of disorder, they maintain, were the 
stock in trade of the European colonist in the eighteenth and nineteenth century.  They 
signified not so much real disorder as difference, or the absence of an imagined order 
that was peculiarly white and Western.  Then, as now, the function of such 
representations is to discipline as well as to describe.  Historically they have provided 
a justification for outside intervention in the territories of other people and, ultimately, 
for the re-ordering of non-Western societies in the image and interests of Western 
power. 
 
Understandably, some people may find this argument difficult to accept.  How can 
anyone equate our own field of study, urban research, with racist colonial prejudices 
when all our efforts are so clearly directed towards improving the welfare of urban 
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populations?  In fact urban development is an unusual case, and one that illustrates 
particularly well both the racist foundations of development discourse and its 
disciplinary functions.  An examination of changes in representations of African cities 
in the Western academy and the media can tell us a lot about the place of race in 
development discourse primarily because most of Africa’s cities were built by white 
Europeans and, at one time, inhabited by them. 
 
Throughout the colonial period the disorder Europeans perceived in other peoples’ 
territories was generally explained in terms of a hierarchy of race.  Different ‘races’ 
were characterised by differing traits and capacities.  Most often the social hierarchy 
that Europeans sought to impose found expression in a metaphor of time.  At first, 
racial differences were seen as given in nature.  ‘Races’ were mapped out along an 
evolutionary time scale reflecting differing degrees of biological advancement.  Later, 
cultural development was used as the marker and different societies were positioned 
in anthropological time in accordance with the degree to which they were thought to 
lack civilization – “the general standards for which the West took to be its own values 
universalised” (Goldberg, 1993: 4).  According to Goldberg, 
 
Those of the East were acknowledged to have civilisation, language, and 
culture.  But, generically, the East was a place of violence and lascivious 
sensuality, the rape of which was thus invited literally as much as it was 
metaphorically.  Africa to the South, by contrast, was the Old World of 
pre-history: supposedly lacking language and culture, the Negro was 
increasingly taken to occupy a rung apart on the ladder of being, a rung 
that as the eighteenth century progressed was thought to pre-date 
humankind (1993: 29). 
 
These differences and hierarchies carried over into understandings of Africans’ and 
Asians’ engagement with urban life.  In the British colonial mentality, the presence of 
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an indigenous urban culture in Asia was itself taken as a sign of civilisation.  It was 
one of the traits that placed the Oriental ‘race’ above the African, whose urban history 
was generally not recognised.  In consequence, urbanised Asians were more easily 
accepted within the colonial order.  In colonial Nairobi Asians may have been 
associated with disease and crime and segregated from whites, but they were 
acknowledged as permanent residents of the city and afforded a certain degree of 
autonomy on that basis.4  Urbanised Africans on the other hand, were perceived as an 
aberration of nature and culture.  In British eyes, their proper place was closer to 
nature in the rural, village society.  For most of the colonial period, despite the fact that 
Africans made up the largest segment of Nairobi’s population, they were designated 
merely temporary residents of the city and were subject to many more controls and 
restrictions than Asians.  According to Lord Luggard, the author of the colonial policy 
of indirect rule, the urbanised African was a socially “displaced person” and, on this 
basis, should be considered something of a degenerate (Werlin, 1974: 48). 
 
Not surprisingly perhaps, the image British colonists had of Africa as an uncivilised 
and chaotic terrain was rarely applied to the African cities they built for their own 
purposes.  If one studies representations of Nairobi in the British press and in popular 
magazines from the 1940s and 50s, prior to Kenya’s independence, the picture one 
finds is quite the opposite of the ‘Third World city’ as commonly perceived today.  At 
this time Nairobi was more usually seen as a place of order and prosperity.  In 1950 it 
was the first town in the British Empire to receive a Royal Charter designating it a city.  
The article that appeared in The Times marking the event stressed the many 
similarities between Nairobi and ordinary English cities.  Most British people who visit 
Nairobi for the first time, its author claimed, “are surprised by its size and its 
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modernity”, its “pleasant, red-tiled, English-style homes”, “golf courses”, “green lawns 
and tree-shaded gardens” (1950: 7).  The article is entitled ‘From Swamp to City within 
the Span of a Lifetime’.  In the founding of Nairobi, it celebrates the imposition of a 
new and distinctly English order upon a pre-existing African landscape that was 
represented as both chaotic and desolate.  
 
Now, let us stop for a moment and jump forward to 1964, one year after Kenya 
achieved its independence.  In that year Charles Abrams published his book, Man’s 
Struggle for Shelter in an Urbanising World, one of the seminal sources on ‘Third 
World’ urban development.  After providing the reader with a whole series of statistics 
and dire predictions about population growth and urban-rural migration in the 
“developing world” Abrams gives us the following account, 
 
With the surge of population from the rural lands to the cities, a new type 
of conquest is manifesting itself in the developing world.  Its form is 
squatting… Little one roomed shacks built of adobe and scrap are 
cropping up in Medellín, Barranquilla, and Cali, Colombia, and in fact 
throughout Latin America.  The colonies lack paved streets, a sewage 
system, and a water supply.  Havana has a profusion of rude huts 
without sanitary facilities.  In Algiers, tin-can towns, or bidonvilles, stand 
just five minutes away from the centre of the city in almost any 
direction… Around the edges of Johannesburg, South Africa, sprawl 
squatter colonies that are a chaos of shacks and hovels pieced together 
by the homeless and destitute.  In India’s larger cities, squatters can be 
found hanging on to their precious hovels in old forts or wherever they 
can find a foothold (1964: 13-14).  
 
What we have here is an early image of the ‘Third World city’ as a generalised 
landscape.  Although Abrams’ description is now well over thirty years old, 
remarkably, it is very similar in form to the description of the ‘Third World city’ Nigel 
Harris provides today. For me, however, what is most striking about this image is how 
completely different it is from the picture The Times portrayed of Nairobi in the 1950s. 
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Why is this?  Notwithstanding Abrams’ account of squatting as “a new type of 
conquest”, most colonial cities were not suddenly swamped with shantytowns after 
independence.  The shantytowns were always there.  The depiction of Nairobi as 
ordered and prosperous in the British press of the 1950s makes sense only if one 
accepts that the shantytowns were not part of the urban landscape, that Nairobi was 
not a black African city but a white European city.  
 
So what is the point being made here?  Of course, after independence Nairobi was a 
black African city.  That said, it would be wrong to suggest that one could account for 
the contrary descriptions of the colonial and post-colonial city purely by pointing to the 
change in colour.  What these examples are intended to illustrate is the disciplinary 
function of discourse, the way that representations of disorder are used to signify 
cultural difference and to justify the control of ‘Others’.  In almost all of the articles 
written about Nairobi in the British press during the colonial period, the greatest 
disorder was understood to lie not within the city, but outside it in the form of the black 
African masses who threatened to return this pristine urban landscape to its savage 
beginnings.  As we saw, however, Nairobi’s boundaries, who was inside and who was 
outside the city, were not defined in spatial terms but in terms of cultural differences.  
The degree to which one was a resident of Nairobi depended not on one’s physical 
distance from the centre of the city, but on one’s cultural distance from the centre of 
civilisation, the West.  For the British, Nairobi to all intents and purposes did not have 
a black African population because Nairobi was a Western city.  The line of difference 
drawn was not purely black/white it was Western/non-Western or, on a more 
elemental level, other/same, them/us.  
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So why did this image of the colonial city change so suddenly after independence?  
Firstly, when we look at Abrams’ description, it is important to note that Abrams 
himself was not British; he was a naturalized American.  In fact, most of the authors 
writing about urban issues in the so-called ‘developing world’ in the 1950s and early 
60s were American. Hoselitz (1953), Friedmann (1965) and Mangin (1967) were all 
Americans.  Cognisant of this, it is much easier to understand why the image 
presented was different.  Americans were not accustomed to the subtle distinctions 
and gradations the British had drawn between black and white, Western and 
non-Western, either in terms of places or categories of people.  For Abrams the line 
between ‘them’ and ‘us’ was more simply defined; there were no white American cities 
in Africa or Asia.  The whole of the post-colonial world was seen as a generalised field 
of difference.  The British could not participate fully in this peculiarly American vision 
until they had experienced what Stewart Hall calls, “a kind of historical amnesia” (Hall, 
cited in Hesse, 1997: 92).  This was a period that instituted the “forgetting of Empire” 
and established the notion that “race is nothing intrinsically to do with the condition of 
Britain” (Hesse, 1997: 92).5   
 
But of course colonial cites were portrayed differently after independence, one might 
argue; we all recognise now that life under colonialism was highly unjust, but nobody 
would expect the British colonial regime to acknowledge this fact by celebrating the 
existence of shantytowns in the midst of Nairobi, a city they had created.  Surely 
Abrams and others like him were merely demolishing this pretence and pointing to the 
reality of the situation on the ground?  No, in the urban disorder they identified, 
Abrams and others like him were more concerned with marking imaginary differences 
and hierarchies than describing any reality.  How do we know this? We know this 
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because the discourse of development, the discourse they created, is just as blind to 
the possibility of any form of disorder in Western cities as was the racist colonial 
discourse that preceded it.   
 
Post-structuralist theorists maintain that words and images are invariably inhabited by 
“traces” or footprints of other absent images or words, that the meanings ascribed to 
particular objects, groups of people or places depend entirely on their relation to, or 
difference from other people and places (Sarup, 1993: 38).  The specialism of urban 
development has always relied on the assumption that the West is diametrically 
opposed in every feature to the so-called ‘developing world’.  On this basis, the 
generalised ‘Third World city’ and its inhabitants are usually described only in terms of 
what they are not.  They are chaotic not ordered, traditional not modern, corrupt not 
honest, irrational not rational, lacking in all of those things the West presumes itself to 
be.  The Americans, in constructing development discourse, maintained an essentially 
arbitrary cultural distinction, Western/non-Western, in their descriptions of the 
post-colonial cities they encountered.  They merely changed the signifiers of 
difference from racial traits to economic characteristics.6 
 
Once again, evidence of this is provided by the many absences in the discourse, its 
geographical blind spots.  In the past, capitalist European countries like Ireland, Spain, 
Portugal and Greece, as well as communist countries like Albania, Romania and 
Yugoslavia, have all fallen below the income level the World Bank set for membership 
of the developed world.  But just as Nairobi was excluded from colonial depictions of 
Africa as a disordered terrain, these places were rarely, if ever, included in 
discussions of the developing world.  To their credit, Gilbert and Gugler highlight this 
10 
anomaly in their book, Cities, Poverty and Development (1992).  However, they still 
insisted upon following the convention themselves.  
 
The blind spots are not simply confined to national characteristics.  The unspoken 
assumption that underpins most representations of the ‘Third World city’ in 
development discourse, that Western cities are not like cites in Africa, Asia or Latin 
America, has never been true.  As Trinh T Minh-ha points out, there have always been 
Third Worlds in the First World just as there have always been First Worlds in the 
Third World (cited in Featherstone, 1995).  
 
This was certainly the case in the decade following the war, although it is not apparent 
in Abrams’ work.  Abrams lists a whole series of former colonial cities where squatting 
emerged as response to housing shortages.  He compares this situation with the 
European experience of squatting.  But he locates this experience in Europe’s distant 
past, pointing to practices of land use prior to the Acts of Enclosure in Britain in the 
eighteenth century.  In fact, squatting was rife in Europe after the Second World War.  
In Britain in the 1940s, tens of thousands of homeless people were squatting in 
disused housing, in army camps, in vacant office blocks and in the empty mansions of 
the wealthy (Friend, 1980: 110-18).  In France population growth and rural-urban 
migration on a scale comparable to post-colonial countries exacerbated urban housing 
shortages.  Several hundred thousand people were still living in makeshift 
shantytowns on the outskirts of Paris and other major cities as late as the mid-1950s 
(Power, 1993: 40). 
 
The fact that Abrams’ did not see these shantytowns cannot simply be dismissed as 
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an accidental oversight.  This omission reflects the endurance of a system of 
representation rather than the lack of vision of a single author.   When Abrams chose 
to locate urban disorder in the West in its distant past he was relying upon a long 
established discourse.  He was stretching difference out along a linear time scale, 
drawing upon a metaphor that was similar in outline, if not in detail, to the racist 
metaphor of hierarchy used by the British colonial regime. 
 
Now, if we shift our attention to the present and look once again at Harris’ account of 
the ‘Third World city’ we can identify precisely the same regularities.  Harris maintains 
that the “most striking visible features of the growth of large cities in developing 
countries” are the “spread of squatter settlements and shanty towns… rapid 
environmental deterioration, giant traffic jams, violence and crime, and urban sprawl” 
(1992: x).  Now, by no stretch of the imagination could one say that Africa, Asia and 
Latin America have a monopoly on environmental decay, traffic jams, crime or urban 
sprawl.  To my mind all but the first of these are equally characteristics of the growth 
of large cities in the West.  Americans, for example, produce more refuse and more 
greenhouse gasses than anyone else on the planet. Greater Los Angeles is the 
archetype of urban sprawl.  It is spread out over a sixty-mile wide circle and, some 
argue, consists not of one, but five distinct cities absorbed within a continuous urban 
conglomeration.  As for traffic jams and crime, notwithstanding the fact that the 
number of vehicles on US roads has doubled since 1970, more people are killed by 
gunfire in Los Angeles than by traffic accidents (Beder, 1997: 233; Anderson, 1996: 
359-60; Soja, 1996: 433-38). 
 
Harris is setting up the same hierarchy we identified with Abrams.  It is present in the 
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implied polarity between Western and ‘Third World cities’, the unspoken assumption 
that the West is free of traffic jams.  Later, it is stated more explicitly when he draws a 
comparison between nineteenth century attitudes to urbanization in Britain and what 
he claims are entrenched anti-urban attitudes amongst governments in “developing 
countries” (1992: x-xiii). Harris’ comments in this regard are especially ironic 
considering the agencies he was addressing, the World Bank in particular, spent 
nearly two decades bullying post-colonial governments into prioritising agricultural 
development and abandoning the social welfare programmes and import substituting 
industrialisation strategies that largely sustained urban populations. 
 
It would be easier to tolerate the persistence of fictional differences and hierarchies in 
development discourse if such wrong-headedness could simply be put down to 
unthinking habit.  However, the image development presents of the ‘Third World city’ 
cannot be seen as purely accidental.  Western representations of ‘Other’ people and 
places have almost always coincided with and reinforced Western interests.  In 
colonial Nairobi the racist stereotyping of urban Africans as degenerate and uncivilised 
served a definite cultural-political purpose.  It enabled Nairobi’s Europeans to reinforce 
their own identities as a ‘decent’, ‘upstanding’, urbanised gentility while simultaneously 
justifying the differential treatment they apportioned to Africans.  The restricted access 
that Africans were afforded to the basic necessities of urban life, the frequent 
appropriations of land and property and the arbitrary expulsions, detentions and even 
killings, could more easily be accepted as legitimate so long as it was believed that 
Africans were ‘not like us’.  Since the end of the colonial period, it is the discourse of 
development primarily that has served to legitimate this differential treatment. 
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This is most evident when one contrasts America’s relations with Europe after the war 
with its treatment of post-colonial countries.  Post-Marxists refer to the arrangement 
that emerged between America and other Western nations after the war as “Fordism” 
(Harvey, 1990; Lipietz, 1992).  Theorists in international relations refer to it as the 
“post-war hegemonic order” (Gill, 1993 & 1992; Cox, 1993).  After the war America 
could have reduced Europe to the level of an underdeveloped economy by exposing 
its industries to relentless competition in free trade.  Instead it chose to finance the 
reconstruction of its competitors’ industries and to tolerate the protectionist bias 
Europe employed in international trade.  According to Lipietz the restraint America 
exercised in international trade allowed European governments the space to negotiate 
the social contract that ultimately united mass production with mass consumption.  
Increases in productivity in industry could only be matched by higher levels of demand 
when state regulation compelled the business community to pay higher wages to their 
workers, increase levels of employment and pay taxes at a rate sufficient to support 
social welfare programmes.  Unbridled international competition could easily have 
undermined this system of regulation by encouraging industrialists to engage in 
continuous cost cutting.  The post-war order gave rise to what many have since called 
the “golden age” of capitalism, a period of unparalleled economic growth and stability 
that raised living standards for millions of ordinary people throughout the Western 
world. 
 
Outside the West, however, American magnanimity did not extend very far.  
Post-colonial nations were never fully included within these arrangements.  While the 
American vision of ‘development’ appeared to offer a more inclusive path to ‘progress’ 
than had previously been the case, in fact the discourse was little more than a 
14 
superficial reformulation of racist colonial prejudices.  It provided a means of 
subverting popular aspirations for radical change in the context of anti-colonial 
struggles while legitimating the continued marginalisation of non-Western peoples.  
After independence development discourse worked to undermine indigenous customs 
of ownership as well as an expanding communist ideology, both of which threatened 
to obstruct the expansion of Euro-American capitalism in the former colonies.  And it 
achieved all this while providing very little in the way of tangible benefits to 
non-Western people.  There was no Marshall plan for Africa.  The limited assistance 
post-colonial countries received in development aid was usually tied more directly to 
short-term Western interests.  As a portent of things to come, Kenya began its 
independence in the 1960s owing a debt of 29 million pounds, a loan that the World 
bank arranged to ensure that departing British colonists would be paid for returning 
part of the land they had originally stolen from the indigenous population (Leys, 1975: 
74). 
 
In the decades after the war, in keeping with national Fordist arrangements, urban 
development was seen almost entirely in terms of state planning within a national or 
local context.  Today city managers compete globally to attract inward investment and 
the business community rather than the state dictates the terms under which 
development occurs.  The explanation most often given for the emergence of this 
‘market-friendly’ approach to urban development is government failure.  Government 
management failed in the 1970s, many have asserted, because state bureaucracies 
were inherently inefficient.   Post-Marxists argue that the failure was wider than this; it 
involved the gradual collapse of the post-war compromise in the West and the 
breakdown of the entire system of economic and social regulation upon which it was 
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built.  The post-war order they maintain, is currently being replaced by an even more 
exclusionary system of “flexible accumulation” (Harvey, 1990: 121-89), or what in 
common parlance is often referred to as the ’neo-liberal’ economy.7  How did this 
happen?  According to Castells, an important faction of the business community was 
and is willing to do whatever is necessary to re-instate the pre-war conditions of low 
wages, low welfare spending, low corporate taxes, minimal regulations and weak 
unions consistent with high profit margins (1991: 231).8  From the 1980s onwards, 
rather than resisting these demands, Western governments chose to encourage them. 
 
As long as America and its partners in the West sustained the post-war social 
contract, one could argue that the differences established within development 
discourse made some sense.  Poverty in the West simply did not occur on anything 
like the scale of post-colonial countries.  This is no longer the case.  The collapse of 
the post-war order has brought about a huge increase in levels of poverty and 
inequality across the entire globe.  The expression ‘there are Third Worlds in the First 
World’ is more true today than it has ever been in the past.  There are now more than 
37 million people without work in OECD countries (UNDP, 1998: 27; 1997: 3).  Over 
42 thousand people are officially classed as homeless in London (Shelter, 2001: 1).9  
Recent estimates place the number of homeless in Los Angeles County at more than 
200 thousand (Wolch, 1996: 390).  Nigel Harris’ may be right when he implies that 
shantytowns are found exclusively in the “developing world”.  However, the only 
reason there are no shantytowns in Los Angeles is because any attempt by the 
homeless to build makeshift shelters in the city is usually met with the kind of 
immediate and brutal repression students of development more commonly associate 
with ‘Third World’ regimes (see for example, Davis, 1992). 
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 The support governments everywhere have shown for the work of NGOs in recent 
years and for voluntarism in public life generally, must be seen in the context of the 
ascendancy of neo-liberal doctrine and the growth in inequality worldwide.  The trend 
towards voluntarism does not reflect a rising interest in popular democracy as is 
commonly presumed, but a deeply cynical abandonment of post-war concerns with 
social welfare and social justice.  
 
Africa’s cites would not be in the deplorable condition they are today if official 
development agencies had shown as much concern for the welfare needs of urban 
populations in the 1980s as they did in previous decades.  Notwithstanding its failings, 
Kenya’s state-led economy of the 1960s and 70s did at least sustain a narrow, urban 
middle-class and help to finance a social infrastructure that, while not comparable to 
Fordist conditions in the West, nevertheless served a wider urban population.  Since 
the 1980s the imposition of neo-liberal policies under structural adjustment 
programmes has led to chronic disinvestment, urban-industrial decline and deepening 
poverty not only in Kenya’s cities, but throughout Africa.10  Charitable development will 
not rectify this situation. 
 
In Nairobi those few NGOs that are active in urban areas work with hundreds of 
people or at best a few thousand when more than half a million live in shanty towns 
with little or no access to adequate shelter and increasingly insufficient means to pay 
for basic services like health and education.11  However, charitable development is an 
inadequate response to urban poverty not merely because the scale of assistance 
provided by NGOs is almost negligible.12  It is inadequate because voluntary 
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organisations are incapable of providing the kind of public control that is necessary to 
protect people from exclusionary market relationships, whether in international trade 
or in urban housing markets.  Nor can they perform the redistributive functions the 
state must undertake in order to establish an equitable and effective system of social 
welfare.  If one asks why NGOs did not figure prominently on the development scene 
in the 1960s and 70s, the most likely answer is because, at the time, this fact was 
widely appreciated.13 
 
Once again there are many similarities between shifting attitudes in the West and in 
post-colonial countries.  In Britain, official attitudes to charity altered considerably in 
the 1980s to the extent that voluntary sector provision became accepted as a 
substitute for state welfare rather than merely a complement. In 1979 government 
grants to voluntary sector organisations as a whole totalled £93 million, by 1986 this 
figure had increased to £300 million (Ware, 1989: 2).  By the end of the decade, 
charity was being used to fund large-scale provision of social housing as well as 
health provision, both capital costs, like the building of new hospitals, as well as the 
routine costs of patient care (Hanna, 1991: 23).  It should be remembered that the 
British National Health Service was established in the 1940s to overturn the 
inadequate and inequitable system of care provided by hospitals dependent on 
charitable funding.  More recently, America’s new president, the staunchly neo-liberal 
Bush, has made the substitution of state welfare with voluntary sector provision a 
central plank of his social welfare strategy. 
 
In the context of welfare retrenchment and growing inequality worldwide, development 
discourse often claims to seek a global solidarity.  However, it continues to define the 
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world in two opposing halves telling each half in a different way that their problems are 
separate.  Advocates of development transform trade, environmental and labour rights 
into “Southern” or “North-South issues” and make appeals to Western charity to fill the 
‘others’ lack.  These narratives feed into and reinforce other discourses of Western 
difference and identity in popular culture, the exotic in tourist representations of the 
post-colonial world, the constant media images of chaos and anarchy in Africa, the 
only reports that ever seem to reach Western television screens.  They all say the 
same thing, that their places are ‘Other’ than ours, that their problems are not our 
own. 
 
C o n c l u s i o n  
 
The argument often made in support of multiculturalism, that all cultural differences 
should be respected equally, is naïve.  It does not take account of the power dynamics 
of culture, the way that cultural differences are constructed and propagated to further 
narrow social interests.  Real differences do exist.  But they can also be transcended 
in specific contexts to create relations of affinity and solidarity.   Where we chose to 
draw the line that separates ‘us’ from ‘them’ is largely a political decision.  
Unfortunately, researchers in the field of urban development have always been far 
more concerned with promoting the latest strategies for development intervention than 
questioning the interests upon which development practice is based.  If we truly are 
concerned with the growth of poverty in the world today we need to ask ourselves how 
effective is it politically for us to perpetuate the fiction that the ‘First World’ and the 
‘Third World’ are two different places?   
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To conclude, one cannot ‘communicate for development’ because, as stated earlier, 
development is not a tangible process or goal, but a discourse.  However, more and 
more researchers are also beginning to recognise that one cannot communicate 
effectively ‘with’ or ‘through’ development because the discourse itself is ultimately 
concerned with power and control.  It does not provide a basis for a dialogue between 
Western and non-Western people on equal terms.  And it discourages both parties 
from recognizing the common problems and common interests that span the 
West/non-West divide, in particular the threat neo-liberal ideology presents to social 
welfare and social justice at a global level.  For growing numbers of development 
sceptics, the most significant line of difference to draw today is not the line separating 
the West from ‘the Rest’, but the line separating apologists for the prevailing doctrine 
of neo-liberalism from people everywhere who seek its downfall.  To paraphrase 
Arturo Escobar, we do not need any more alternatives of development, what we need 
now are alternatives to development (1995: 215).  
 
                                                          
1.  This quotation is from Swift’s, On Poetry: A Rhapsody (1733) and was cited in Anne McClintock 
(1994: 27). 
2. The term ‘Third World’ itself, it is true to say, was not simply a western construction but was part of 
the vocabulary of the non-aligned movement.  However, as Harris points out, the expression no 
longer signifies the non-aligned countries it was originally intended to describe but has gradually 
come to stand for all “developing countries” (1986: 7).  I use the term in a wider sense to refer to a 
discourse about non-Western cities with its origins in Western modernity.   
3.  “The West” here is not meant to denote an area defined by lines of latitude and longitude on a map.  
As Stewart Hall points out, “‘the West’ is a historical not a geographical construct” (Hall, 1994, 277).  
Michael Keith and Steve Pile refer to the term as a “linguistic condensation of the globally powerful” 
(1993: 22).  It delineates a cultural space occupied by a particular form of rationality or modernity, a 
collection of principles for organising people in time and space rather than an area on a 
geographical map.  And, it is defined as much by how it represents its “Others”, the Non-West or, as 
Hall puts it, “the Rest”, as by how it sees itself.  In this sense of the word Japan, although east of 
Europe, could be understood as similarly “Western”. 
4.  For example, while Asians were allowed some direct representation on Nairobi’s Municipal Council, 
Africans were not. 
5.  It is interesting to note that John Turner, one of the early and more celebrated British authors writing 
about cities in ‘developing countries’, lived in Peru in the 1950s and spent the 1960s in North 
America working at the same research institute as Abrams and Friedmann. 
6.  The position I am taking here, some will say, is nothing new.  In the mid-1980s Nigel Harris himself 
was arguing that the ‘Third World’ had come to an end (1986).  The distinction traditionally drawn 
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between developed and developing regions, the ‘First’ and the ‘Third World’, he claimed, was no 
longer valid.  “Newly industrialising countries” like Korea, Malaysia and Singapore had grown so 
much economically in recent decades, he maintained, that they now have more in common with the 
West than they do with most other developing countries.  My argument, however, is that the 
distinction has always been arbitrary, that the economic changes Harris identifies are not nearly so 
significant as he thinks because development discourse has always been far more concerned with 
marking cultural difference than charting economic statistics. 
7.  The term neo-liberalism is most widely used in Latin America.  It is a term more often applied in 
criticism than in praise having been adopted to describe the economic policies imposed in the region 
after the international banking crisis of the early 1980s, or the so called 'third world debt crisis'.  
Broadly speaking, neo-liberal doctrine is distinguished by the primacy it affords the role of 'the 
market' in human affairs and the laissez-faire approach to government it advocates.  It is so called 
because it is generally seen as a revival or variant of the economic liberalism that prevailed in the 
19th and early 20th century.  As an ideology, it stands in opposition to Keynesianism and the 
post-war consensus of the welfare state, the system that supplanted the nineteenth century liberal 
order. Its declared aim is 'efficiency', welfare maximization through market competition.  State 
intervention in the marketplace is conceived as stifling of competition, by definition inefficient.  Thus, 
the liberalism espoused is always an economic liberalism, the freeing of business from state control.  
Although neo-liberalism is generally associated with the right-wing governments of Margaret 
Thatcher and Ronald Regan, neo-liberal policies were implemented before this in the 1970s, by the 
Pinochet regime in Chile, and by the Labour governments of Wilson and Callaghan in Britain.  The 
policies neo-liberalism encompasses include the privatisation of public enterprises, reductions in 
government spending, deregulation of domestic markets, removal of barriers to international trade 
and investment, the promotion of 'export-led growth', and monetarist policies directed toward the 
control of inflation.  Today, the neo-liberal outlook is taken for granted in countries all over the world 
and is embraced as much by traditionally left-of-centre, social-democratic governments as by the 
right. 
8. The neo-liberal agenda is extremely short sighted.  As Lipietz and Harvey point out, in the long run, 
the business community must employ sufficient numbers of people and increase wages sufficiently 
to allow workers to become consumers of the goods they produce. Cutting wage costs while 
pushing for greater levels of productivity makes no sense.  The overproduction that inevitably results 
creates deflationary pressures that can eventually lead to recession or even depression.  In other 
words, the neo-liberal agenda is not even in the long-term interests of capitalists themselves. 
9.  It is notoriously difficult to arrive at an accurate estimate of the number of people sleeping rough in 
London on any given night.  The figure given here for the number of homeless in the city was 
compiled by the British voluntary organisation Shelter from Local Authority and DETR statistics.  It 
includes people in temporary accommodation as well as people living on the streets.  However, as 
Shelter points out, these statistics show only the number of households who approach local 
authorities for help and are found to be homeless.  Under the Housing Act 1996 councils have a 
duty to house ‘priority need’ homeless households in temporary accommodation for a period of two 
years.  Thus, the figure of 42 thousand homeless does not include people for whom local authorities 
have no responsibility to provide accommodation and who do seek or get help from their council.  
The majority of single people or childless couples are included in this category. 
10.  By insisting on the elimination of trade barriers official development agencies removed one of the 
few bargaining chips that post-colonial governments held in the competition for inward investment.  
Once these trade barriers had been removed multinational corporations no longer needed locally 
based production centres to supply Africa’s domestic markets with goods.  The African market could 
be supplied from America, Britain, Mexico or China, or wherever investors were offered the best 
deal in terms of low production costs, minimal regulation and high value incentives.  Encumbered by 
debt, African governments could not and still cannot compete with the scale of business 
inducements offered by countries in the West and in South East Asia.  Between 1989 and 1994 the 
number of British manufacturing companies with equity holdings in Anglophone Africa dropped by 
one third.  In the five years between 1988 and 1993 an annual investment from France of 1 billion 
dollars turned into a net outflow of 800 million dollars (Ayittey, 1998).  Total Inflows of foreign direct 
investment in Kenya amounted to 39 million between 1986 and 1990.  These inflows dropped to a 
total of just $8.9 million in the 4 years from 1990 to 1994 (Ikiara, 1996).  . 
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11.Rising costs of living have seriously eroded peoples’ incomes in Kenya’s urban areas.  Real wages 
in Nairobi fell by 45% between 1982 and 1994, and by 55% in urban areas as a whole (Ikara & 
Ndung’u, 1999: 99). 
12.In fact, the scale of assistance provided by NGOs in general is negligible.  If we add up all the 
money Western NGOs spent in ‘developing countries’ in 1995, 6.7 billion dollars, it amounts to less 
than one ninth of the British government’s annual budget for its National Health Service.  But more 
tellingly, the figure is thirty six times less than the 246 billion dollars ‘developing countries’ spent on 
debt repayments to the West in the same year [this figure was compiled from statistics cited in the 
Human development Report 1998, (UNDP, 1998)]. 
13.In relation to land, for example, the 1976 Habitat recommendations state: “Private land ownership 
is... a principal instrument of accumulation and concentration of wealth and therefore contributes to 
social injustice; if unchecked it may become a major obstacle in the planning and implementation of 
development schemes ... [its] management should be subject to public surveillance or control in the 
interest of the nation” (Habitat, in Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1981, 227).  Levels of inequality in 
distribution of property have worsened significantly since the 1970s.  Despite this fact, this kind of 
public control over land ownership is rarely recommended today. 
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